Kuzey Korenin artan gerginliği: Scott Snyder ve Dr Robert Kelly Vikihaber röportajı

4 Nisan 2013, Perşembe

Son günlerde, Kuzey Kore komşu Güney Koreye ve Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine savaş tehditlerinde bulunuyordu. Tansiyonun tırmanmasına ek olarak Kaesong Endüstri Parkını Güney Koreli işçilere kapatılması kararıda alındı.

Vikihaber güvenlik ve diplomasi konusunda uzmanlaşmış Güney Kore Pusan ​​Milli Üniversitesinden (PNU) Dr. Robert Kelly ve Kuzey Kore uzmanı Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Dış İlişkiler Konseyinden (CFR) Scott Snyder ile röportaj yaptı.

Vikihaber Göreviniz nedir?

Dr. Robert Kelly: PNUda Uluslararası ilişkiler profesörüyüm.

Scott Snyder: Ben Kore Araştırmalarına kıdemli akademisyen ve CFRda ABD–Kore politikası için program direktörüyüm.

WNIQ Kuzey Kore Güney Koreyi birçok kez tehdit etti, bu tehditleri uygulamaya geçme olasılığının ne kadar olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?

RK: Çok düşük ihtimal. Bir savaş çıkarsa Kuzey Kore bunu kaybeder ve eğer nükleer silah kullanırlar ise global olarak bütün sempatilerini kaybederler ve Çin onları terk edecektir. Bu tehditlerin sebebi GKyı [Güney Kore] ve yeni başkanını yardım için biraz sallamak, bir savaş başlatmak için değil.

SS: Kuzey Kore'nin tehditlerinin çeşitli amaçları var. Bazıları savunma amaçlıdır ve Kuzey Kore'nin kendi zayıflıklarına karşı diğer ülkelerin agresif tutum almalarından caydırmak içindir; bazıları müzakerelere yönelik taktik olarak hazırlanmıştır; bazıları Kuzey Kore'nin ağır sonuçlar doğurmadan yürürlüğe koyamayacağı niyetleri veya istekleri ifade etmek içindir; ve bazı çok özel amaçlı tehditlerke Kuzey Kore'nin uygulamaya çalıştığı gerilla stratejisinin parçası olup gerginliğin artışını engellemeye ve supriz unsurundan yararlanayı hedefler. KK [Kuzey Kore'nin] tehditleri ciddiye alınmalıdır, fakat dikkatle değerlendirilerek hangi koşullarda uygulamaya geçilebileceği belirlenmelidir.

WNIQ Güney Koreliler Kuzey Kore'nin nükleer silah programı hakkında ne düşünüyorlar?

RK: They do not like it of course, but they worry far less about it than outsiders would expect. South Koreans have been living under this shadow for many years. The North has made many threats in the past. So NK is like the boy who cried wolf. No one expects them to launch a weapon.

SS: Increasingly unsettled and concerned, especially about the possibility of being subject to nuclear blackmail. At the same time, this circumstance thus far has had negligible impact on South Koreans' daily lives.

WNIQ} Are South Korean citizens carrying on their day to day lives as normal?

RK: Yes, they are. This is not like the Cuban Missile Crisis when people were emptying the store shelves and building bunkers in their basements. My students are coming and going like normal. Indeed, South Koreans' composure is very impressive.

SS: Yes.

WNIQ Is North Korea becoming further isolated in the world?

RK: Yes, it is. Threatening nuclear war is a genuine escalation that would alienate any state. Importantly though, NK is already fairly isolated. And because China, its main aid supplier, does not cut it off, further isolation has few practical impacts.

SS: North Korea is increasingly politically isolated but it is comparatively more economically and informationally connected than it was a decade ago.

WNIQ Is the South Korean military well-prepared to deal with any conflicts with the North Korean military?

RK: Yes. The ROKA (Republic of Korea Army - Kore Cumhuriyeti Ordusu) [Republic of Korea Army, of South Korea] is a modern, well-trained, well-groomed force with substantial technical and organization superiority over the Kore Halk Ordusu|KPA [Korean People's Army, of North Korea]. To date, the South Koreans have not responded to Northern provocation in order to avoid escalation, not because they are incapable. SK conventional superiority is augmented further by US assistance.

SS: South Korea will decisively win most direct conventional engagements with the North, but is vulnerable in selected theaters where North Korea perceives a lack of readiness or a tactical advantage.

WNIQ Is the closure of Kaesong by North Korea, evidence of further escalating tensions between the two nations?

RK: Yes and no. It is important, because it is a source of hard currency for the North, so its closure suggests that the North is willing to carry genuine costs over this feud. On the other hand, the SK media identified the closure of Kaesong early as a marker of NK seriousness, saying very openly that if NK did not close the facility, they did not really mean what they were saying. In other words, NK was, I think, goaded into closing Kaesong in the war of words, not as a part of any larger strategic plan.

SS: Thus far, it is a symbolic evidence of potential for escalating tensions, but has not yet resulted in material changes. Let's see how the situation plays out over the next couple of days. Kaesong will only become vulnerable when operations halt and when financial transfers connected to failure of operations become operative.

WNIQ North Korea has moved one of its missiles that carries a large range missile to its East Coast, is this a serious move?

RK: I don't think it's as serious a move as the Basın-yayın|basın has made it out to be. First of all they just moved one [missile]. Second of all, it's not clear that North Korea actually has nuclear warheads that are small enough to actually put on top of missiles; they tell us this but Atom bombası|nükleer silah are actually pretty heavy, which is why nükleer füzeler are frequently quite large, so moving the weapon there doesn't necessarily mean it's pointed at the United States or Tokyo which I suppose would be the likely targets. It's not clear that it's necessarily a nuclear missile and it's not being fueled or anything so far as I know so again it's sort of more of the same... bluffing...sort of talking around the issue and sort of saying things that don't actually have genuine consequences so my sense is it's more of a war of words.

WNIQ There's a lot of talk about Kim Jong-un being an inexperienced leader — do you think he knows where the 'brink' lies?

RK: That's actually a really good question. No, I don't, which is why we're having this whole conversation. Kim's father, Kim the second [|Kim Cong-il], was actually very good about this, "good" in quotations I suppose. He knew really well how to play this game, he knew really well how to play the South, particularly for aid, rice, assistance, fuel, things like that. The new guy — he's only been in there for a year-and-a-half, right, 14, 15 months — he didn't go through the grooming processes of the regime, he didn't go through the military or the party. And he certainly has no military training, it's not like he went to some military institute — he went to some boarding school in İsviçre, or something like that. So it's not at all clear that this guy knows, sort of how this is done. I have a feeling myself that he's being egged on by the generals at home, and the generals are really doing this because they do not want the military's position to be lowered in the new order. Under the previous Kim, under the second Kim [Kim-Jong-il], the military was raised in the constitution to a very high level of importance, they were sort of the primary pillar of the government, this is called the Songun|'Önce ordu' policy. I think people now worry that the new Kim — in order to re-start the economy might downgrade the role of the military, and I think that is where all this is coming from. I don't think they want a war.

WNIQ All of these threats, do you think they are just a way of getting more economic aid from the United Nations?

RK: I wouldn't say the Birleşmiş Milletler [UN] because the UN role in this is actually pretty minimal. It is true that there are some UN specialized agencies that operate in North Korea — the Dünya Gıda Programı I believe is the big one because North Korea constantly has food problems — and there are western Sivil toplum kuruluşu|STKlar, and yardım kuruluşları, hayır kurumları and stuff like that, also operate in North Korea. I've actually been to North Korea and I've seen these charities operate. I've actually met some of the people who actually live there and do this stuff. But they're actually pretty small, right? I mean, the North Koreans are pretty worried about Batı dünyası running around in North Korea making trouble and saying things and this and that. Any kind of foreign penetration in North Korea is very, very limited. I think the real issue is actually North Korea's neighbors, specifically Japonya, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti, the United States and South Korea. Russia's really sort of a bit player in this drama. And that's what they really want, the North Koreans now are very dependent on only the Chinese. They used to be able to play the Chinese off the South Koreans off the Japanese off the Americans and extract aid and concessions from each of those. In the last ten years or so it has become harder to do that — particularly Japan, the United States and South Korea have closed ranks and don't really deal individually with North Korea anymore. This has pushed North Korea to China. North Korea doesn't like being dependent on just one player. And so I think that's what this is an effort to shake up, [...] a very difficult game for the North were they an economic colony of China.

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